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In Ledbetter v. Goodyear (2007) the U.S. Supreme Court was asked to clarify Title 
VII’s rules related to the timeliness of pay discrimination claims. The Court’s 
decision formalized the legal difference between discrete instances of 
discrimination and the lingering effects of discrimination as they relate to how 
much time an employee has to file a discrimination claim with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission. A key distinction was drawn between a 
discriminatory organizational pay structure and the actions of individual 
supervisors. Ultimately the Court equated decisions related to pay with other 
personnel actions and requires employees to promptly file an alleged 
discriminatory action with the EEOC. When considered in the context of the 
limitations of the Equal Pay Act, the Ledbetter decision further tips the weighing of 
interests toward the employer. 
Pay inequity by gender remains an indelible characteristic of the U.S. work- 
place despite two independent and long-standing federal protections against
discrimination in compensation.1 The Equal Pay Act of 1963, since incorporat 
ed into the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, requires employers to compensate 
employees of different genders at the same rate, provided the employees hold posi 
tions “the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and 
which are performed under similar working conditions.”2 Similarly, Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful “to discriminate against an individual with respect 
to…compensation…because of such individual’s…sex.”3 Both of these laws are 
enforced by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), albeit with dif 
ferent rules related to, for example, the timeliness of the filing of claims of alleged 
discrimination. 
In Ledbetter v. Goodyear4, the U.S. Supreme Court was asked to clarify the statute 
of limitations under Title VII as it relates to filings with the EEOC. The Act requires that 
a charge be filed within 180 days “after the alleged unlawful practice occurred.”5 At 
issue in Ledbetter was whether there is a distinction between discrete instances of 
discrimination and the lingering effects of discrimination in terms of how much time a 
claimant has to file a discrimination claim with the EEOC. 
 
Title VII 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 constituted a major overhaul of the federal government’s 
efforts to promote equal employment opportunity. In particular, Title VII prohibited 
discrimination by private sector employers and labor organizations with respect to the 
“terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,” including compensation, on the basis 
of an applicant’s or employee’s “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”6 In 
addition, a new federal enforcement agency, the EEOC, was created to implement the 
Act and “to intervene in a civil action…by an aggrieved party against a respondent.”7 
Thus, the EEOC was charged with receiving, processing, investigating, and attempting 
to resolve discrimination complaints brought against employers in the private sector.8 
 
Lingering Effects Under Title VII 
Title VII clearly prohibits acts of overt, intentional discrimination in employment, or so- 
called disparate treatment, on the basis of certain protected demographic 
characteristics. A key question that arises, however, is the extent to which the law also 
protects employees against the lingering effects of prohibited discrimination long after 
the actual employment decision or action occurred. This issue can be succinctly framed 
by two Supreme Court decisions. 
In Bazemore v. Friday9, a racially discriminatory compensation scheme was in 
place at the North Carolina Agricultural Extension Service prior to the enactment of 
Title VII, and persisted after the Act was extended to the public sector in 1972. 
Although damages could not be recovered for pre-Title VII discriminatory disparities in 
pay, the Court ruled that liability for such a facially discriminatory practice existed “to 
the extent that this discrimination was perpetuated after 1972.”10 Since an 
organizational policy led to the pay disparity, each paycheck was a discrete, and 
actionable, act of discrimination. 
The Court differentiated the on-going implementation of such a facially 
discriminatory policy from the lingering nondiscriminatory effects of past acts of 
discrimination in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan11. Allegations related 
to discrete discriminatory acts that occur at a particular place and time must be filed 
with the EEOC within 180 days, or else those claims are time-barred. Consistent with 
precedent12, such discriminatory acts include “termination, failure to promote, denial 
of transfer, [and] refusal to hire.”13 Discrimination stemming from a hostile work 
environment, as opposed to that based on a discrete act, was also recognized in 
Morgan. While no single action in such a context may be actionable on its own, a court 
may look at the frequency, severity, nature, and interference caused by the behavior to 
find a Title VII violation so long as an action related to the claim occurred within the 
filing period. On-going effects of discrete instances of discrimination, however, do not 
themselves initiate a new charging period. 
 
Ledbetter V. Goodyear 
Lilly Ledbetter worked for the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company from 1979 to 1998. 
As with all other salaried employees, changes in her compensation level were 
dependent upon supervisory performance evaluations. Ledbetter alleged that her 
evaluations were systematically biased against her, and resulted in an artificially 
deflated level of compensation at the end of her employment with Goodyear. She 
initiated the complaint process with the EEOC in March 1998 on the grounds that she 
received a discriminatorily low salary because of her sex, thus constituting a disparate 
treatment violation of Title VII. This action established a time frame such that Ledbetter 
could only challenge actions that occurred within the previous 180 days. Although she 
received paychecks within the 180 day window, Goodyear argued that only those 
supervisory actions that may have affected Ledbetter’s salary and also occurred within 
the prior 180 days could be included in the Title VII claim. The District Court found in 
favor of Ledbetter on the basis that her salary was likely affected negatively because of 
her sex. The 11th Circuit Court reversed, however, on the grounds that only those 
actions that occurred within the statutory window were admissible and, consequently, 
there was insufficient evidence to support the claim of sex discrimination. Ledbetter 
then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
The central question in Ledbetter was whether disparate pay received during the 
180 day statutory limitations period is covered by Title VII when the disparity is the 
result of acts of intentional discrimination that occurred outside of the limitations 
period. The petitioner, Ledbetter, argued for an expansive application of the Bazemore 
scheme, relying heavily on a phrase from Justice Brennan’s opinion that “each week’s 
paycheck that delivers less to a black than to a similarly situated white is a wrong 
actionable under Title VII.”14 Conversely, Goodyear argued that the claim was time- 
barred by the 180 day EEOC deadline as per the Morgan decision since determinations 
of compensation were discrete acts. A 5–4 Court ruled that the filing deadline clock 
with the EEOC is aligned with the occurrence of the discriminatory act, rather than a 
subsequent instance of effect, and thereby disallowed Ledbetter’s Title VII claim. In 
short, the observed pay disparities were the result of discrete discriminatory acts (i.e. 
annual considerations of raises and compensation) consistent with the Morgan 
precedent and were time-barred. 
By framing the complaint in terms of disparate treatment, Ledbetter was required 
to show discriminatory intent on the part of Goodyear. Writing for the majority, Justice 
Alito concluded that petitioner’s arguments were not grounded on an allegation of 
intent, but rather that her “paychecks were unlawful because they would have been 
larger if she had been evaluated in a nondiscriminatory manner prior to the EEOC 
charging period.”15 As such, Ledbetter’s claim was that the issuance of her last 
paycheck in 1998 was discriminatory because it “carried forward the effects of prior, 
uncharged discrimination decisions.”16 Relying on the precedent set in Morgan and 
related cases, the Court concluded: 
 
The EEOC charging period is triggered when a discrete unlawful practice takes 
place. A new violation does not occur, and a new charging period does not 
commence, upon the occurrence of subsequent nondiscriminatory acts that 
entail adverse effects resulting from past discrimination. But of course, if an 
employer engages in a series of acts each of which is intentionally discriminatory, 
then a fresh violation takes place when each act is committed.17 
 
Thus, the start of the 180 day charging period with the EEOC is commensurate 
with the occurrence of an identifiable action or decision that itself is a violation of Title 
VII, and not the lingering effects of such an action or decision that would have 
constituted a violation had it been pursued in a timely manner. The EEOC charging 
period is tied to the occurrence of a discrete act of discrimination, “not from the date 
when the effects…are felt,” so there are no legal consequences for the present 
nondiscriminatory effects of “prior, uncharged discrimination.”18 In this way, 
Ledbetter’s claim of gender-based discrimination failed to demonstrate the 
discriminatory intent in Goodyear’s actions during the 180 day statutory window 
necessary for a successful disparate treatment claim. 
Ledbetter’s reliance on the Bazemore precedent was also rejected. In that case, 
paychecks were issued using a discriminatory pay structure that amounted to disparate 
treatment at an organization level. This precedent would apply to Ledbetter’s claim 
only if Goodyear had either instituted a general pay structure in order to discriminate 
on the basis of sex or had “applied this system to her within the charging period with 
any discriminatory animus.”19 Rather, Ledbetter claimed that she was discriminated 
against individually by her supervisors throughout her tenure and that negatively 
affected all of her paychecks (although the Court did not recognize actions that 
occurred in Ledbetter’s last 180 days of employment as sufficient themselves to prove 
sex discrimination). The distinctions between a discriminatory organizational pay 
structure and the actions of individual supervisors, and recent (within the previous 180 
days) discriminatory acts and the lingering effects of past acts, meant that the 
Bazemore scheme did not apply in Ledbetter and that the Morgan precedent made the 
claim time-barred. 
 
Dissenting View 
The cumulative effect that such actions can have over time on an individual’s level of 
compensation was a key point for the four dissenters. They drew a distinction between 
adverse employment actions like termination, the failure to promote, and the refusal to 
hire that are relatively easy to identify in time20 and disparity in pay. Writing for the 
dissent, Justice Ginsberg argued that the latter often occur in small increments such 
that a significant amount of time must pass before the employee recognizes the pay 
disparity, and: 
 
It  is  only  when  the  disparity  becomes  apparent  and  sizable…that  an 
employee…is  likely  to  comprehend  her  plight  and…complain.  Her initial 
 
readiness to give her employer the benefit of the doubt should not preclude her 
from later challenging…a wage depressed on account of her sex.21 
 
To the contrary, Ginsberg contended that discrimination occurs whenever a 
paycheck is issued that reflects sex-based discrimination, so that claims based on both 
discrete acts and the cumulative effect of discrete acts are actionable. This view of Title 
VII and the Morgan and Bazemore decisions suggests that the issuance of a paycheck 
“constitutes an unlawful employment practice” and restarts the 180 day EEOC filing 
period. 
In addition, the dissenters argued that pay disparities are unlike other adverse 
employment actions because the employer can obfuscate discriminatory actions for an 
extended period of time, and certainly longer than 180 days. Ginsberg observed that 
“employers may keep under wraps the pay differentials…, no less the reasons for those 
differentials.”22 Similarly, an employee may receive a raise, but a discriminatorily low 
raise, and thus not immediately suspect disparate treatment. And even if such an 
employee suspects sex-based discrimination, the differential dollar amount may be 
“too small, or the employer’s intent too ambiguous, to make the issue immediately 
actionable—or winnable.”23 From this perspective, pay discrimination operates more 
like the hostile work environment form of discrimination recognized in Morgan than 
its discrete discriminatory act standard relied upon by the majority. 
 
Equal Pay Act 
A notable curiosity of Ledbetter v. Goodyear is the absence of the Equal Pay Act in the 
petitioner’s claim to the Supreme Court. As explained in a footnote in the opinion, 
Ledbetter had initially brought both EPA and Title VII claims to magistrate court, but 
chose to proceed to trial with only the latter. Despite obvious similarities, the two laws 
function differently in their protections against discrimination.24 Notably, the EPA does 
not require proof of intentional discrimination as “inadvertent violations…carry the 
same weight, although the statute of limitations is extended for willful discrimination.” 
Given the Court’s stated rationale for siding with Goodyear, one could speculate that 
Ledbetter’s claim could have been bolstered by the inclusion of the EPA. Indeed, Alito 
observed that had Ledbetter relied on the EPA, “she would not face the Title VII 
obstacles that she now confronts.”25 Conversely, punitive damages are available under 
Title VII but not the EPA.26 
One the other hand, Justice Ginsberg observed that while Title VII protects five 
demographic classes, the EPA is concerned with only sex-based discrimination. While 
claims alleging sex discrimination can still be brought under the EPA, the Ledbetter 
ruling impedes claims based on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin under Title 
VII. As Ginsberg explained, the ruling would force claimants in a race-based 
discrimination claim related to compensation “to sue to soon to prevail, while cutting 
them off as time barred once the pay differential is large enough to enable them to 
mount a winnable case.”27 
 
Furthermore, some analysts suggest that having the EPA as a fall-back option for 
sex-based compensation discrimination claims is hardly reassuring.28 Zeigler29 
observed that the EPA has a narrow definition of which co-workers can be used for 
comparison in the identification of a pay disparity and also clearly describes the legal 
justifications for differences in compensation. Such explicitness signals “to the 
unscrupulous employer how one might justify or rationalize a discriminatory 
practice,”30 Indeed, Zeigler concluded that EPA claims are generally unsuccessful due 
to the difficulties in establishing a prima facie case, identifying an appropriate 
comparator, the range of affirmative defenses available to the employer, reluctance of 
the EEOC to pursue EPA claims, and the narrow scope of the Act to cover “only the 
most obvious and blatant forms of compensation discrimination.”31 
 
Conclusion 
In language resembling a stage aside, Justice Alito recognized that the 180 day EEOC 
filing deadline is “short by any measure” but such was Congress’ intent to protect 
employers from defending claims of lingering effects based on actions taken that are 
long past.32 Such a short deadline also reflects congressional preference for the prompt 
resolution of allegations of employment discrimination. The Court clearly expressed a 
reluctance to second-guess such intent, or to view Ledbetter as an opportunity to 
access policy-based arguments on the real politic of pay discrimination or the 
limitations of the EPA. Justice Alito asserted that the majority would do no more than 
“apply the statute as written.”33 As such, the Court clearly rejected a remedy under Title 
VII for a pay discrimination claim based on lingering effects. To the extent that a 
compensation decision (e.g. a raise or bonus) is based on one’s current pay level, an 
uncontested discriminatory act or unsuccessful claim of discrimination early in a career 
literally affect salary and retirement levels for the rest of an employee’s life. 
Under Ledbetter, the burden squarely falls on the employee to contest any pay- 
related decision or action within 180 days or else they may feel indefinite lingering 
effects. As such, the incentive for the employee is to regard each pay-related decision 
with suspicion, and to act swiftly to submit a claim to the EEOC alleging discrimination. 
Although the employer, Goodyear, was the prevailing party in Ledbetter, the decision 
may prove to be a Pyrrhic victory for employers if they are forced to counter 
increasingly speculative allegations of discrimination filed by employees under Title VII. 
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